THE MOBILIZATION OF ARMY RESERVE COMPONENTS: ADDRESSING FUTURE CAPACITY GAPS IN POWER PROJECTION PLATFORMS
Not since World War II has the United States National Military Strategy (NMS) relied so heavily upon the use of the Army National Guard (ARNG) and United States Army Reserve (USAR) to prosecute a war. The "Total Force Policy" instituted in 1973 eliminated our nation's ability to rapidly expand the size of our military force through the draft, and placed our reserve components (RC) in the role of a strategic reserve. Today, the RC role has expanded exponentially beyond that of a strategic reserve, into one in which they are fully integrated into the NMS as an operational force. At the core of this strategy is the ability to respond to crises worldwide through power projection, primarily by the deployment of U.S. based active component (AC) and RC forces. Until recently, the large-scale mobilization of RC forces was the subject of many contingency and operation plans, but rarely evaluated at a strategic level to determine the validity of these plans. When looked at critically, many mobilization plans relied upon Power Projection Platforms (PPPs) that no longer existed, or were outdated due to the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) legislation of the last decade. This point is illustrated in a Government Accounting Office (GAO) report released in September 2004 that states:
The Army was not able to efficiently execute its mobilization and demobilization plans because the plans contained outdated assumptions concerning the availability of facilities and support personnel. Power Projection Platform identifies the cooperative role and responsibility for installations in the active, direct execution of the National Military Strategy to project forces beyond the borders of the United States to anywhere in the world with little advanced notice. It reflects the normalization of an activity that traditionally has been approached on an ad hoc, crisis-induced basis.
2 While a step in the right direction, this strategy fails to comprehensively evaluate and account for the effects that modularity, current BRAC actions, and the Integrated Global
Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS) will have upon the current PPP inventory. The number one goal of this strategy is to "reshape installations to meet power projection specifications", in order to better support their power projection responsibilities through the inherent phases of training, deployment, support, and follow-on. 3 The biggest shortcoming of this strategy is that it relies primarily on the availability of resources through the Planning Programming, and Budget Execution System (PPBES) to provide military construction (MILCON) funds as means for accomplishing this strategy. Currently the Army is not adequately funded to take care of the facilities they already have, considering the latest facilities Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization (SRM) backlog is reported as $17.8 billion, and the unfunded MILCON facilities deficit is $25 billion. 4 In fact, Congress is concerned that current operations tempo is increasing this backlog of SRM, and has directed each service to report on this backlog within 90 days of enactment of the 2006 MILCON Appropriations Bill. 5 The competition for fiscal resources within the Department of Defense (DOD) has and will continue to be fierce, and creates the most significant vulnerability or risk to this strategy.
In suggesting a more feasible solution to the current imbalance in this strategy, this paper examines four main areas. First, it establishes the increased reliance on the Army RC in executing our NMS. Second, it considers how modularity, current BRAC actions, and the IGPBS will impact the current PPP inventory. Third, it identifies current gaps and risks through an Ends, Ways, and Means analysis of existing mobilization strategy. Last, it concludes with a recommendation on ways to address these capacity gaps in order to reduce risk and achieve a more desirable and better-balanced strategy centered on providing a capable PPP inventory and the necessary enablers to mobilize our Army RC forces.
Strategic Relevance of the Reserve Components
The ARNG traces its roots to 1636, where in the Massachusetts Bay Colony the first permanent militia regiments where organized to provide for the defense of the colony. 6 The formal creation of the ARNG however is traced to provisions of the United States Constitution, which declares:
Congress shall have power …To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline subscribed by Congress. 7 This role of the ARNG remained largely unchanged until Secretary of War Elihu Root initiated the Militia Act of 1903, also known as the "Dick Act", which strengthened the ARNG as a part of the national defense force and declared the ARNG to be the Army's primary organized reserve. 8 Just over a decade later, The National Defense Act of 1916 further expanded the Guard's role by establishing the State militias' status as the primary reserve force of the Army.
Additionally, this act required use of the term "National Guard" when referring to this force.
Lastly, the President was given authority, in case of war or national emergency, to mobilize the NG for the duration of the emergency.
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The USAR was formally organized in 1908, primarily as a reserve medical corps for the Peter J. Schoomaker has worked hard to bring about a change in the organizational culture of the Army by integrating the RC into all aspects of current operations. He has also been a driving force in the development of strategies in which the reserves are essential to the future of the Army, and supports a vision of embracing the reserves as full partners. One such example of the RC importance as strategic players is illustrated in the Army's plan for their conversion to the modular force.
Modularity and the Army Reserve Components
The overwhelming share of the combat force within the Army RC resides in the eight divisions of the ARNG. Starting this fiscal year and ending in FY 08, each of these divisions will undergo conversion to the modular force. This is a significant departure from the concept employed over the past decade of maintaining an increased level of readiness in the 15
Enhanced Brigades, and recognizes the robust capability of a Division headquarters to manage multiple brigades given varying and complex mission sets. this transformation is the fact that each of these 34 BCTs will be organized, equipped, and manned exactly as their AC counterparts. 19 The USAR is also restructuring and rebalancing its force to meet the imperatives of the Army's modularity initiative by allocating 30,000 spaces to support modularity, and by developing smaller, more agile, interchangeable units with an expeditionary mindset. 20 By organizing, equipping, and manning these RC units the same as their active duty counterparts, planners can easily develop models and plans that permit the interoperability of both AC and RC formations into planning and contingency scenarios.
Modularity and the Active Component
The AC Army is also currently undergoing transformation to the modular force NMS. 21 This model calls for a military force sized and capable to defend the homeland, deter forward in four regions, be capable of two, almost simultaneous "swift campaigns" and win decisively in one of them, even if engaged in a number of smaller contingencies . 22 The addition of these BCTs will place additional stresses upon many of our existing military installations due to the requirement to support this increased troop density, and ancillary requirements such as family housing, community support, maneuver training areas, simulation systems, and health care, to name a few. Additionally, an underlying principle of the Modularity initiative is that our installations will become "flagships" for our units, providing support not only in peacetime, but assuming a larger role in supporting the deployed force by providing a robust reach-back capability through advanced communications technology. 23 Key to the conversion to a modular force is the near simultaneous transformation of our installations that must also occur to complement and support that force. The modularity initiative will boost the number of combat forces available to the Army by up to 5 percent. But it may require an additional 60,000 personnel to do so (or twice the temporarily authorized increase), and it will make the Army more reliant on reserve support units. Moreover, modularity is unlikely to lead to substantial improvements in deployment times.
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Given this finding, the impact the addition of AC forces has on the ability of these installations to generate a "surge" in our military end strength through the mobilization of RC forces, along with how these forces are generated warrants further analysis.
The ARFORGEN Model
According to the 2005 Army Strategic Planning Guidance, implementing Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) will result in "Reduced stress on the force through a more predictable deployment cycle." Key to this plan is the following deployment objectives:
-One year deployed and two years at home station for the active component;
-One year deployed and four years at home station for the Reserve Force;
-One year deployed and five years at home station for the National Guard Force; and -Reduced mobilization times for the reserve component as a whole. 26 ARFORGEN is defined as:
…A force management process, leveraging modular unit designs and operational cycles, to provide a sustained deployment capability of operationally ready units to satisfy the requirements regional combatant commanders will place on the Army. 27 The central principle of ARFORGEN is to supply regional combatant commands and civil authorities tailored conventional Army forces that can be rapidly deployed and utilized to accomplish specific mission requirements. 28 ARFORGEN makes these units available through …A structured progression of increased unit readiness over time, resulting in recurring periods of availability of trained, ready, and cohesive units prepared for operational deployment in support of regional combatant commander requirements. 29 In order to accomplish this strategy of "structured progression of increased unit readiness", RC forces must be afforded an increased number of resourced training opportunities as they progress towards their "ready cycle". Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, Chief of the Army
Reserve, recently announced how the USAR will reorganize to meet the challenges of providing troops under the ARFORGEN model. The "Army Reserve Expeditionary Force" (AREF) is the name of this broad-based set of changes that defines how the USAR will organize, train and equip forces to meet the needs of the Army. 30 In what looks to be closely modeled after the Air Knox, while losing the Armor School, has gained a BCT, US Army Accessions Command and US Army Cadet Command. 36 The net result is a diminished capacity to execute a mobilization mission due to competition for the fixed resources of these installations. Further impacting the ability of these installations to execute a mobilization mission is the IGPBS.
The Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy
On 16 August 2004, President Bush announced the IGPBS, a plan outlining far-reaching changes to the numbers and locations of military basing facilities at overseas locations. 37 This plan has significant strategic impact upon our power projection platforms. IGPBS is the DOD's long-term, comprehensive and integrated overseas strategy to rebalance and redistribute US force overseas to reflect current and future security concerns. The strategy supports the return of a significant number of forces to the continental United States. Within a decade, up to 70,000 soldiers and 100,000 dependents will relocate from Europe and Asia to military installations located in North America. 38 While not all of the stationing decisions have been made concerning this return to a CONUS based force, two things are clear. First, this strategy will add significant stresses to the infrastructure of the installations designated to support this expanding population, and second, the financial cost associated with completing this strategy will be large.
The cost of new MILCON required to support the IGPBS is currently estimated to be 2.6 billion dollars, and Congress has directed this to be funded out of the FY 06 -FY 11 MILCON budget. 39 The implications here are that other programmed infrastructure requirements may have to be sacrificed in order to support this strategy. Since a significant number of the MILCON projects in the current FY 06 -FY 11 POM are related to modularity, many of these projects could be delayed for years. As these projects are delayed, our installations will be taxed to continue doing more with less and forced to make difficult resourcing decisions. Most The Army is faced with a lack of transient training facilities. This shortage has developed over the past 60 years and is due to the tearing down of old facilities, little or no construction of new facilities, and the training requirements placed upon CONUS installations by Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. This situation adversely impacts both the mobilization of Army personnel and the Army concept of Train-Alert-Deploy. 40 Unfortunately, the construction of ORTCs is a long way from reality, given the current MILCON backlog, competing interests, and "must fund" requirements (BRAC, GWOT, etc…).
As recognized in this memorandum, this lack of required resources is having a direct impact on the ability of these installations to execute their PPP and mobilization missions, thereby creating risk in current mobilization strategy.
Ends, Ways, and Means
The United States' desired results (Ends) is the successful execution of its National 41 This risk is illustrated in the fall 2004 GAO report referenced earlier that states:
The Army was not able to efficiently execute its mobilization and demobilization plans because the plans contained outdated assumptions concerning the availability of facilities and support personnel. As a result, some units were diverted away from their planned mobilization sites, and disparities in housing accommodations existed between active and reserve forces. 42 Furthermore, the same report concluded:
The presence of large active duty and reserve contingents on the same installations at the same time also strained training and medical facilities. Fort Hood officials said that the scheduling and rescheduling of training ranges presented major challenges during 2003 when the installation was preparing to deploy both its active divisions and a large group of reserve component forces at the same time. 43 Another example illustrating this point occurred in fall 2003, when news reports surfaced that due to facility shortages at many installations RC soldiers where being housing in substandard and sometimes deplorable conditions. 44 These reports drew national media attention because many of these soldiers were the sick and wounded returning from Iraq and Afghanistan. The public response to this was severe, and two garrison commanders and the First Army Commander, Lieutenant General Joseph Inge, were called to testify about these allegations before the House Armed Services Committee. 45 A few months later, the newly appointed First Army Commander, Lieutenant General Russell Honoré deemed the care and treatment of sick, wounded, and injured soldiers as the number one mission for the mobilization stations operating in First Army. Consequently, the inability of these PPPs to adequately support the surge population of reservists further stressed their effectiveness by causing them to shift and focus finite resources on quality of life issues, further detracting from their ability to generate, project, sustain and reconstitute the force.
In an Associated Press interview with General Schoomaker conducted on August 20 th ,
2005, General Schoomaker stated the Army is planning for significant troop levels in Iraq for four more years. 46 If this becomes the reality, then the Army is going to continue its reliance on mobilizing the RC to meet mission requirements. Given this scenario or one in which we face a future requirement to rapidly increase the size of the Army through mobilization of our RC, the . 47 Since then, it has been continuously involved in the mobilization of Army RC soldiers, supporting the peace mission to Bosnia, deployments to Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Command. 54 The mission of each JFHQ is defined as follows:
The Joint Force Headquarters of each state, territory, Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia exercises command and/or control over all assigned, attached or operationally aligned forces. It acts as a standing, forward-deployed joint force headquarters, within the geographic confines of the state/territory/ commonwealth or district; it provides situational awareness of developing or ongoing emergencies and activities to federal and state authority. As ordered, the JFHQ provides trained and equipped forces and capabilities to the services and the Combatant Commanders for federal missions. This proposal is also supported by Lieutenant General James R. Helmly's restructuring initiative for the USAR. In order to obtain the right force mix to support the war fight, the USAR has initiated a program to cut force structure from its generating base of RRSCs will be well suited to facilitate and enable USAR home station mobilization much in the same manner as that proposed in the preceding paragraph for the JFHQ.
Tasking the RRSCs to conduct post-mobilization training and certification for subordinate units also supports the Army Campaign Plan (ACP) mission to "rebalance the generating force resourced by the USAR" (ACP Decision Point 57). In doing so, The Installation Management Agency has recommended transforming GSUs to better support a "continuous mobilization environment "(ACP DP 57.1). GSUs are the USAR units that currently manage the mobilization mission at active installations. Through rebalancing the generating force, the USAR hopes to yield over 20,000 soldiers for the operational force. 59 The target established by LTG Helmly is to make available 90% of the 4,002 USAR soldiers currently assigned to GSUs, or a total of 3,602. In doing so, this leaves only 400 USAR soldiers available for direct assignment to mobilization support. 60 IMA plans to mitigate this "gap" through contract support for all but a handful of those positions deemed necessary to be filled by a soldier, such as command structure, chaplain support, and judge advocate general positions. This solution will work, but the cost has proven to be several million dollars per year per installation. A more reasonable solution that poses less risk is to build the necessary force structure into the RRSCs to accomplish this mission.
Lastly, this strategy supports building a tailored approach to Army RC mobilizations. As 
Conclusion
In summary, this paper has outlined the strategic relevance of the Army RC, and illustrated some of the seams in our ability to mobilize, train, deploy and reconstitute these forces under our current strategy. These seams are likely only to grow due to the impacts and costs of Modularity, BRAC, and the IGPBS to our current AC PPPs. To mitigate this risk to our current strategy of over reliance on existing AC PPPs and use of a relatively small number of RC PPPs, we should explore additional RC assets within the Army inventory that are available to execute the mission of mobilizing our RC forces. The recent successes of two National 
